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REVISITING THE TRIPS REGIME: RWANDA-CANADIAN
ARV DRUG DEAL 'TESTS' THE WTO GENERAL
COUNCIL DECISION
REBECCA AMOLLO*
On 17 July 2007, the world was awakened to Rwanda's notification of the World
Trade Organisation's (WTO) Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) that it plans to import the HIV-drug TriAvir from
Canada's giant pharmaceuticals company, Apotex. Two months later, Canada
issued a compulsory licence allowing Apotex to use nine patented inventions for
manufacturing and exporting TriAvir to Rwanda. On 4 October 2007, Canada
notified the Council for TRIPS of the compulsory licence. In September 2008,
Apotex said it will ship seven million antiretroviral pills to Rwanda to treat 21,000
patients. Against this backdrop, this article uses the Rwandan-Canadian drug deal
to examine the utility of the WTO General Council Decision in making ARV
drugs more accessible to Low and Middle Income Countries so far. In doing so,
the article's analyses rely on the regime of the Canadian Access to Medicines
Regime which was enacted after the WTO Decision. The author discusses some
of the issues arising from the deal in light of the effectiveness of the General
Council Decision in solving the problem of access to antiretroviral drugs within
the right to health and HIV/AIDS context. The article also raises questions relating
to the willingness of developing countries to take benefit of the TRIPS flexibilities
and the obligation of developed countries to ensure that the flexibilities become a
reality.
I. INTRODUCTION
When Rwanda announced its intention to import generic drugs from Canada,
Stephen Lewis, had this to say:
This is a significant step...Forgetting all the negotiations and
shenanigans over the last few years, we can begin to save lives. That
is what is crucial.'
* Doctoral Candidate, University of the Western Cape, Faculty of Law, Community Law Centre.
Email: ramollo@uwc.ac.za. The author would like to thank Dr Lilian Chenwi and Siyambonga
Heleba for comments on the paper.
1 Medical News Today, 'GSK Gives Consent to Canadian Drug Company to Manufacture Generic
Antiretroviral For Rwanda'. Available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/79445.php.
Stephen Lewis is the former United Nations Special Envoy for HIV and Aids in Africa. 17 July
2007. Accessed 21 August 2008.
17 RADIC (2009) DOI: 10.3366/E0954889009000395
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He also said elsewhere:
The logjam has been broken ... by the government of Rwanda's
request for the Canadian generic drug. It is very dramatic and very
important because the dream of this legislation ... was that it would
save lives. That's what it was all about, that Canada would produce the
generic drugs that would allow countries to keep their citizens alive.
2
The saying goes that if one cannot invent, at least one can copy. For many sub
Saharan countries, copying technologies for producing antiretroviral treatment
(ARVs) remains a distant aspiration. Africa constitutes about 10 per cent of the
world's population but is home to over 70 per cent of the people living with H1V.'
In 2006, it was estimated that approximately 2 million people were reported to
have lost their lives as a result of HIV/AIDS related illness.4 Women have been
the worst hit by the epidemic, constituting about 50 per cent of the world infection
rate and about 60 per cent of the total rate in Africa.5 In many African countries,
access to treatment and care for people living with HIV remains a great challenge.
Of the approximately 4.6 million people in need of treatment, only about 23
per cent of them are receiving it in the region.6 The problem is not limited to
HIV/AIDS alone. Other diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria continue
to pose great threats to lives on the continent.
There is a stark disparity in access to pharmaceutical products between dev-
eloped and developing countries. Developing countries make up approximately 80
per cent of the world's population but only represent approximately 20 per cent
of global pharmaceutical consumption. 7 Transnational corporations own approxi-
mately 90 per cent of technology and product patents in the world, and up to
80 per cent of technology and product patents in developing countries. This
persisting inequity has been attributed to lack of resources, skill inadequacy,
market failures, high drug costs, weak or corrupt institutions, government failures
and income differences.8 All these factors combined result in less than effective
pharmaceutical purchasing and distribution systems thus impeding availability of
ARVs. One of the issues attending accessibility to ARVs within the context of
many sub Saharan countries is the intellectual property regime. The regime
of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement
has been widely criticised for further impeding access to ARVs. 9
2 M. Rimmer, 'Race against Time: The Export of Essential Medicines to Rwanda' Public Health
Ethics (2008): 89-103: 14.




7 J. C. Cohen, M. Gyansa-Lutterodt, K. Torpey, L. C. Esmail and G. Kurokawa, 'TRIPS, the Doha
Declaration and Increasing Access to Medicines: Policy Options for Ghana', Globalization and
Health (2005): 1-17.
8 M. R. Reich, 'The Global Drug Gap', 287 Science (2000): 1979-81.
9 The TRIPS Agreement is Annex IC of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994.
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Availability within the context of HIV/AIDS has been argued to entail life
saving drugs, procurement strategies of ARVs, and financing the extending
initiatives." The point has been advanced in the same vein that failure to
innovate, transfer technology, produce, procure and import drugs are some of
the major barriers attributed to availability of medicines." It has further been
argued that improving and sustaining access to antiretroviral treatment (ARVs)
by people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs) is a practical way to strengthen HIV
prevention, care, treatment and support. This position has received support from
several circles including at the international human rights law level where the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR Committee), the
body charged with the responsibility of interpreting and monitoring the treaty,
has elucidated on what access to medicines means within the right to health.
12
This will be dealt with later in this paper. Against this backdrop, this paper
argues, inter alia, that since most countries in the sub Sahara continent are not
yet able to produce ARVs locally, at the very minimum, states must make effort
to procure their availability to their citizens. This duty is accompanied by the
obligation of the international community to cooperate in this bid. This paper uses
the recent Rwanda-Canadian drug deal to illustrate some of the issues surrounding
this bid, especially under the WTO TRIPS system. The paper highlights some of
the issues arising from the deal that could be considered in assessing the utility
of the WTO Decision in making ARVs more accessible to Medium and Low
Incomes Countries (LMICs), especially those in sub Saharan Africa. Some of
the critical questions arising within this debate include: without the capacity to
produce ARVs, what should a sub-continent threatened by an epidemic do in order
to make available AIDS drugs? Does the Canadian Access to Medicines Regime
represent a beacon of hope in this regard? Do the TRIPS regime and its subsequent
modifications offer any real solutions to least developed countries particularly
in sub Saharan Africa? The paper concludes that the WTO system is neither
expeditious, nor a solution because of the unnecessary rigours accompanying
its procedures. In the same vein, the paper critiques the Canadian Access to
Medicines law, and makes some recommendations in that regard.
II. ACCESS TO ARVS: THE DUTY TO PRODUCE AND PROCURE AS A
COMPONENT OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
The right to health has been dogged with definitional difficulty. Historically, health
care systems were developed on a curative or clinical model of health. However,
10 D. Mushayavanhu 'The Realisation of Access to HIV and AIDS-Related Medicines in Southern
African Countries: Possibilities and actual Realisation of International Law Obligations', in
E Viljoen and S. Precious (eds), Human Rights Under Threat: Four Perspectives on HIV AIDS
and the Law in Southern Africa, PULP (2007), p. 127.
11 ibid.
12 See General Comment 14 2000, 'The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health' (art.
12 of the Covenant) UN Committee on Economic, Social and cultural Rights. Twenty-Second
session), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000).
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recently, advances in epidemiological research have sensitised policy and law
makers to the importance of public health interventions and preventive strategies
of health promotion.13 It can however be argued that such definitional problems
attend all human rights and particularly those affirming economic, social and
cultural human rights. Different terms have therefore been used to describe rights
concerning health care.'4 The terms 'right to health', 'right to health protection' or
' right to health care' have all been advanced as sufficiently conveying the notion
of entitlement to the protection of health and the provision of heath care under
international law and domestic legal systems.15 This paper however does not seek
to delve into the debate of the appropriateness of terminology. The paper uses the
'right to health' phraseology.
A human rights perspective of access to AIDS drugs would locate it in the
right to health, although it can relate closely to other rights like the right to life.' 6
This is especially so because human rights norms have been argued to set broad
standards for the obligations of countries with regard to realising the citizen's
human rights.' 7 In this regard, Yamin notes:
Human rights law not only offers an alternative paradigm for
understanding issues relating to the availability and distribution of
medications, it also provides a workable framework for influencing
the way in which adjudicative and legislative bodies, as well as
other actors, make decisions that affect access to medications. The
right to health could mean, among many things including availability
of treatment for opportunistic infections to which they are subject
because of the failure of their immune system as a result of H1V
infection. It could also mean availability of health facilities which are
13 See generally, A. R. Chapman and S. Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia (2002).
14 B. Toebes The Right to Health as a Human Right in International law, Intersentia (1998);
B. Toebes The Right to Health in International Law, Intersentia-Hart (1999), pp. 22-4; B. Toebes
'Towards an improved understanding of the international human right to health', 21 Human
Rights Quarterly (1999): 661-3 in C. Ngwena and R. J. Cook, 'Rights Concerning Health', in
D. Brand and C. H. Heyns (eds), Socio Economic Rights in South Africa, Pretoria University
Law Press (2005). See a criticism of a 'right to health' as opposed to a 'right to health care'
in R. Macklin, Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in
Medicine, Oxford University Press (1999), p. 235.
15 There appears to be no necessary conflict between the terms 'right to health', 'right to health
protection' or 'right to health care'. Proponents of the terms 'right to health' or 'right to health
care' or 'right to health protection' have argued that these terms are more accurate and more
realistic than 'right to health' in that health itself can not be guaranteed. They argue that, at best,
the state can provide diagnostic, preventive, curative and rehabilitative services for the attainment
of health. See also R. Roemer, 'The Right to Health Care', in H. L. Fuenzalida-Puelma and
S. S. Connor (eds), The Right to Health in the Americas: A Comparative Constitutional Study,
Pan American Health Organization (1989), pp. 17-23; H. Hannum, 'The UDHR in National and
International Law', 3 Health and Human Rights (1998): 145, 153.
16 C. Onyemelukwe, 'Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs as a Component of the Right to Health in
International Law: Examining the Application of the Right in Nigerian Jurisprudence', 7 African
Human Rights Law Journal (2007): 446, 448.
17 Z. Lazarinni, 'Access to HIV Drugs: Are we Changing the Two World Paradigm?',
17 Connecticut Journal of International Law (2002): 281, 288.
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necessary, especially for those who can no longer benefit substantially
from the sole treatment of opportunistic infections.18
The right to health is provided for in most international treaties. The earliest
modem human rights instrument - the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(hereafter referred to as the UDHR), proclaims the right to health;19 the
International Covenant on Economic Social Cultural Rights (hereafter referred to
as the ICESCR) further contains a provision that has been lauded as the most
important provision for the realisation of the right to health.20 It provides for
the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health;21 the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) also provides for the right to health; 22 the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC);23 and other authoritative consensus documents. 
24
Like all other human rights, the right to health imposes on countries the
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill this right.25 As stated above the CESCR
has interpreted the right to health as precisely relating to several elements
namely, availability, and accessibility, acceptability and quality.26 The Committee
explained that 'availability' requires that the public health care facilities,
goods and services be available in sufficient quantity.27 'Accessibility' has the
overlapping dimensions of non-discrimination, physical accessibility, economic
accessibility and information accessibility.'28 The accessibility principle involves
18 Y. E. Yamin, 'Not just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right under International Law',
21 Boston University International Law Journal (2003): 325, 327. See also H. Watchirs, 'A
Human Rights Approach to WV/AIDS: Transforming International Obligations into National
Laws', 22 Australian Yearbook of International Law (2002): 77, 79-80.
19 See Art. 25 of the Universal Declaration. It was adopted and proclaimed by the UN General
Assembly in resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 at Paris.
20 A. R. Chapman, 'Core Obligations Related to the Right to Health and their Relevance for South
Africa', in D. Brand and S. Russell (eds), Exploring the Core Content of Socio-economic Rights:
South African and International Perspectives (2003), p. 40.
21 Art. 12 of the CESCR.
22 Art. 12. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
1979; UN document A/34/36.
23 Art. 24. The CRC was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1989. It entered
into force on 2 September 1990.
24 Notably the UN International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo,
5-13 September 1994; Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 4-15 September
1995;UN Millennium Development Goals, available at www.un.org/milleniumgoals (accessed
11 July 2006). See Goal 8 on AIDS. For the human rights aspects of the MDGs, see P. Alston,
'Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate
seen through the Lens of the Millennium Goals', 6 Human Rights Quarterly (2005): 755-829;
The Heads of State and Government and Representatives of States and Governments assembled
at the UN for a special session of the General Assembly. The session adopted the Declaration of
Commitment on HIV/AIDS. This took place from 25 to 27 June 2001. This was in accordance
with Resolution 55/13.
25 Supra note 12, para 33.
26 Supra note 12, paras 12 (a-d); T. Barnett and A. Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-first Century:
Disease and Globalisation Palgrave Macmillan (2002).
27 Supra note 12, para 12 (a).
28 Supra note 12, para 12 (b).
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affordability and thus requires countries to provide what may be necessary for the
enjoyment of the right to health for people who cannot afford to provide it for
themselves. It has been suggested in this regard that it is obligatory for countries
to put in place health insurance schemes to enable their citizens to pay for health
services.2 1 This is particularly crucial in developing countries where affordability
is largely non existent. It has therefore been suggested that it is necessary to
take steps to the extent possible to provide free ARVs for those who cannot
afford to pay for them and to subsidise other costs associated with anti-retroviral
treatment. It also requires that health facilities should be accessible to all parts
of the country.30 'Quality' ensures cultural acceptability, scientific and medically
appropriateness of health facilities, goods and services, and good quality.?
The obligation to provide health care also relates to the minimum core which
in this case would be the obligation to provide accessible ARVs as an essential
medicine.3 2 The 'essential medicines' concept prioritises a limited list of vital
and essential drugs that are supposed to be effective, safe, good quality and
affordable for treating 'the priority health care needs of the population' ." About
the minimum core concept, Bilchitz argues that its 'principle' relates to 'minimum
essential levels of the right'. According to Bilchitz, it refers to the minimum basic
resources that are necessary to allow individuals to be free from threat to their
survival and to achieve a minimal level of well being.34 'The core is the minimum
essential level of health that states have priority obligations to provide' and below
which a state should not fall.3 5 Bilchitz argues that in relation to health care, the
imposition of such an obligation would involve not only primary health care, but
also the provision of expensive drugs that are necessary to preserve life. This can
be argued to include the obligation to provide ARVs. It is important to note that
the minimum core standard requires that the services should be made available on
demand as contrasted with the 'progressive realisation' standard which is spread
over time as determined by the availability of resources.
In particular consideration of the hurdles posed by pharmaceutical patents,
for example insufficient manufacturing capacity and failure to innovate, amongst
29 Onyemelukwe, supra note 16.
30 This would involve ensuring that rural areas have health facilities which PLWHA living in rural
areas can easily access. The quality principle states amongst other things that the right to health
includes the provision of unexpired drugs as well as trained health personnel. Countries would
therefore have to monitor the proper administration and utilisation of ARVs provided to PLWHA.
31 This requires, inter alia, skilled medical personnel, scientifically approved and unexpired drugs
and hospital equipment, safe and potable water, and adequate sanitation. See note 12 above,
para 12 (d).
32 Supra note 12, para 43. See also D. Bilchitz, 'The Right to Health Care Services and the
Minimum Core: Disentangling the Principled and Pragmatic Strands', 7 ESR Review (2006):
2; Pierre de Vos, 'Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs post-Grootboom' 3 ESR Review (2002): 22;
S. Khoza, 'Reducing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV: The Nevirapine Case', 3 ESR
Review (2002): 2.
33 WHO, 'Essential Medicines', http://www.who.int/essential-medicines/en/ (accessed 15 July
2008).
34 Bilchitz, supra note 32, p. 2.
35 L. Foreman, 'The Imperative to Treat: The South African State's Constitutional Obligations to
Provide Antiretroviral Medicines', http://www.ualberta.ca (accessed 12 June 2008).
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others, 3 6 the obligation to make HIV/AIDS drugs available would refer to the need
for countries to take legislative steps to ensure that developing countries benefit
from agreements in international trade organisations, such as the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), which allow for public health exceptions to intellectual
property rules, thus allowing for the manufacture, exportation and importation of
cheaper generic versions or calls upon developed countries to assist resource-poor
developing countries in ensuring that their actions as members of international
organisations take into consideration the right to health.37 It is against this
obligation that Canada enacted an Access to Medicines law in 2004. This law
is discussed later in this paper.
Besides the inextricable link between access to ARVs and the right to health,
it has been argued that eliminating the obstacles which may impede access to
and the delivery of ARVs in developing countries is also necessary for the full
enjoyment of the right to health.38 Hosseinipour et al argue that the interpretation
of the right to health to include the underlying determinants of health would
mean that countries have obligations under the right to health to deal with the
political, economic and health structures obstacles which may prevent access to
ARVs, including the inadequacy of a health infrastructure, the non-availability of
trained medical professionals, particularly in rural areas, and inequitable resources
distribution.39
Although categorised as 'soft law' the Declaration of Commitment on
HIV/AIDS, adopted by the General Assembly, also recognises that access to
ARVs is fundamental to realising the right to health of People Living With
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) and is an essential part of the efforts by countries to combat
the epidemic:
Recognising that access to medication in the context of pandemics
such as HIV/AIDS is one of the fundamental elements to achieve
progressively the full realization of the right of everyone to the
36 For more on these barriers, see, generally, P Cullet, 'Patents and Medicines: The Relationship
between TRIPS and the Human Right to Health', 79 International Affairs (2003): 107-38; B.
Loff and M. Heywood, 'Patents on Drugs: Manufacturing Capacity or Advancing Health?', 30
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics (2002): 621. See also M. Berger, 'Tripping over Patents:
AIDS, Access to Treatment and the Manufacturing of Scarcity', 17 Connecticut Journal of
International Law (2002): 157.
37 Art. 8. See also art. 15 of the Declaration of Commitment on H1V/AIDS UNGA ResA/Res/S
26/2).
38 Onyemelukwe, supra note 16, p. 60.
39 M. C. Hosseinipour, P. N. Kazembe, I. M. Sanne and C. M. van der Horst, Challenges in
Delivering Anti-retroviral Treatment in Resource-poor Countries (2002), 16 (Suppl. 4) AIDS
S178; S. S. Abdool Karim, Q. Abdool Karim, G. Friedland, U. Lalloo and W. M. El Sadr,
Implementing Anti-retroviral Therapy in Resource-constrained Settings: Opportunities and
Challenges in Integrating HIV and Tuberculosis Care (2004) 18 AIDS 975; UNAIDS, Report
on the Global AIDS Epidemic, UNAIDS (2004); C. Webb 'AIDS: The Real Problem is Getting
the Medicine out', International Herald Tribune 14 July 2004; see also the case of Minister of
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others, Case CCT 8/02, where the court
required the state to make human resources available, including the provision of counselling
facilities.
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enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.
41
This has been argued to indicate that countries recognise, at least in principle, the
danger that HIV/AIDS poses to societies in developing countries and the role that
anti-retroviral treatment can play in mitigating such danger.4' Like most soft law
instruments which are not intended to be legally binding, the Declaration reflects a
good faith commitment and a desire to influence the actual practice of countries.
4 2
It can therefore be seen as reflecting the desire of countries to provide access to
ARVs (amongst other things), and as a tool to encourage governments to act in
response to the need for wide access to ARVs in developing countries.43
The Office of the UN High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) and
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) formulated the
International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and human rights (Guidelines). This was
in line with the General Comment on health, which includes access to essential
drugs like ARVs, and the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights.
44
The guidelines built on expert advice to integrate the principles and standards of
international human rights law into the HIV/AIDS response. They are non-binding
but have been argued to form a 'soft law' bridge between 'hard law' international
obligations and the practice of countries.45 The guidelines provide, inter alia, that:
Universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care and
support is necessary to respect, protect and fulfill human rights related
to health, including the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard
of health. Universal access will be achieved progressively over time.
46
Following the 2001 developments resulting from the United Nations Declaration
of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the Doha Declaration, in 2002, the OHCHR
and the UNAIDS updated the Guidelines. The revision was also meant to take into
account the obligation of countries to provide ARVs as part of the right to health as
40 See art. 15 of the Declaration.
41 Onyemelukwe, supra note 16, p. 458.
42 See A. E. Boyle, 'Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law', 48
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1999): 902, where the author describes how soft
instruments may become non-binding law.
43 D. Patterson and L. London, 'International Law, Human Rights and HIV/AIDS', 80 Bulletin of
the World Health Organisation (2002): 964, 966.
44 UNAIDS and OHCHR, International Guidelines on HIVIAIDS and Human Rights (1997).
See also UNAIDS and OHCHR, International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS: Revised Guideline 6
(2002). The guidelines were developed by the Second International Consultation on H1V/AIDS
and Human Rights. The Guidelines were drawn up after the Secretary-General of the UN
recommended to the Commission Human Rights that guidelines were needed to outline clearly
the application of human fights in the context of H1V/AIDS.
45 Watchirs, supra note 18.
46 The guidelines were drawn up after the Secretary-General of the UN recommended to the
Commission Human Rights that guidelines were needed to outline clearly the application of
human rights in the context of HIV/AIDS.
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interpreted by the CESCR.47 This resulted in the Revised Guideline 6 (Revision)
which specifically refers to HIV/AIDS treatment and recommends that enactment
of legislation by countries to provide for HIV-related goods, safe, services and
information so as to ensure, among other things, safe and effective medication.
48
The Revision requires countries to ensure access to essential medications at
affordable prices, and on a non-discriminatory, sustainable basis. 49 It further
requires countries to take measures to ensure for all persons, on a sustained
and equal basis, the availability and accessibility of HIV-related goods, including
anti-retroviral and other safe effective medicines. It calls upon countries to pay
a particular attention to vulnerable individuals and populations.50 The Revision
further recommends that countries increase their budgetary allocation in order to
provide sustainable access to ARVs and other HIV/AIDS related goods.51 Despite
the framing of the Guidelines which recognises that the right to health must
be achieved progressively over time, it states that countries have an immediate
obligation to take steps as quickly as possible to ensure, among other things,
access to treatment.
52
Closer to home, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African
Charter) provides for the right to health.53 This arguably includes the obligation
to provide access to AIDS drugs. In terms of communications, however, there
has been no access to AIDS drugs - related case submitted to the African
Commission on Human and People's Rights (African Commission).5 4 In the
absence of any jurisprudence on the subject, there is no point of reference
in terms of interpretation by the African Commission on state obligation to
provide HIV/AIDS drugs. The African Commission however did find that
states have an obligation to ensure that health care facilities and commodities
including drugs are made available to citizens.5 5 There have however been
illustrious domestic decisions on legal obligation to provide access to HIV/AIDS
treatment, for example, in South Africa, the Constitutional Court handed down
an instructive judgment in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign
(popularly known as the TAC case).56 The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC),
a ginger non Governmental Organisation, launched a constitutional challenge,
47 Supra note 12; UNAIDS and OHCHR, International Guidelines on HIVIAIDS and Human





51 Ibid, para (c).
52 Preface to Revised Guideline 6, supra note 47.
53 See art. 16 of the African Charter. The African Charter, also known as the 'Banjul Charter',
was adopted by the African Union in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 1981 and entered into force in
October 1986.
54 See generally S. Gumedze, 'HIV/AIDS and Human Rights: The Role of the African Commission
on Human and People's Rights', 4 African Human Rights Law Journal (2004): 181.
55 See Purohit and Moore V The Gambia Communication 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR
2003). Decided at the 33rd ordinary session of the African Commission (15-29 May 2003).
56 2002 5 SA 721 CC.
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alleging a violation of the right to access health care services and demanding
a program to make the drug available throughout the country. At the time of
the case, South Africa was in the midst of an HIV/AIDS epidemic with more
than 6 million people infected. The Court ordered the Government to extend
availability of Nevirapine to hospitals and clinics, to provide counselors; and to
take reasonable measures to extend the testing and counseling facilities throughout
the public health sector.
More recently, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women's Protocol) became
the first document to provide for binding obligations on the right to health
with specific mention of HIV/AIDS.57 The African Women's Protocol requires,
inter alia, that state parties take all appropriate measures to provide adequate,
affordable and accessible health services, including information, education and
communication programmes to women especially those in rural areas. 8 This
obligation is particularly crucial in light of the fact that women form the larger
population of people affected with HIV/AIDS.
In recent resolutions, the African Commission has recognised that access to
medications in the context of a pandemic such as HIV/AIDS is a fundamental
element to realising the right to health and calls upon countries to pursue policies
which ensure the availability, accessibility and affordability of pharmaceutical
products and medical technologies necessary for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. '9 It
further called upon countries to adopt and implement legislations and positive
measures in accordance with international law and international agreements
acceded to in order to safeguard access to pharmaceutical and medical
technologies from any limitations by third parties.
6
57 Adopted in Maputo in July 2003 and entered into force 25 November 2005, available at
http://www.africa-union.org (accessed 10 March 2006).
58 Art. 14(2) (a). See also, R. Amollo 'A Critical Reflection on the African Women's
Protocol as a means to Combat HIV/AIDS among Women in Africa', unpublished
masters thesis, University of Pretoria. Available at https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/iteis-by
author?author=Amollo%2C+Rebecca 10k; R. Amollo, 'The Protocol on Women's Rights in
Africa: What does it say about Gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS?', 2(1) Iminyango
Quarterly Newsletter (2007), available at www.gbvhiv.org.za/iminyango-newsletters/iminyango-
vol2-no-l.pdf; E Banda, 'Blazing a Trail: The African Women's Protocol comes into Force',
50 Journal of African Law (2006): 72; M. S. Nsibirwa, 'A Brief Analysis of the Draft
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights', 1 African Human Rights Law
Journal (2001): 40; R. Karugonjo-Segawa, 'The Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa' (2005) Research Partnership, Danish
Research Institute for Human Rights; S.A. Kaniye-Ebeku, 'A New Hope for African Women:
Overview of Africa's Protocol on Women's Rights', 13 Nordic Journal of African Studies (2004):
264, available at http://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/voll3num3/ ebeku.pdf (accessed 12 April
2006).
59 See Commission on Human Rights, 'Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics such
as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria', 561h Session of the Commission on Human Rights
E/CN.4/2003/L.33. See also Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2001/33, 'Access to
Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS', adopted 20 April 2001 (E/CN




Still on the African continent, the African Union (AU), and its predecessor,
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a number of declarations
pertaining to H1V and AIDS. One of the most significant of these is the 2001
Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious
Diseases (Abuja Declaration).6' In terms of access to ARV drugs and HIV/AIDS,
African heads of state resolved, inter alia, to support the donor community funds
providing ARV programmes in Africa.6 2 Further, African leaders undertook to
mobilise all the human, material and financial resources required to provide
care and support and quality treatment to their populations infected with
HIV/AIDS, among other things, and to organise meetings to evaluate the status
of implementation of the objective of access to care.63
Even more pertinent, the heads of state resolved under the Abuja Declaration
to enact and utilise appropriate legislation and international trade regulations to
ensure the availability of drugs at affordable prices and technologies for treatment,
care and prevention of HIV/AIDS, amongst others.64 This was accompanied by
the resolution to take immediate action to use tax exemption and other incentives
to reduce the prices of drugs and all other inputs in health care services for
accelerated improvement of the health of our populations.65 It can therefore be
concluded that at Abuja, there was political consensus that access and availability
of affordable drugs was pivotal to AIDS care efforts.
Also notable among the efforts on the African continent is the Solemn
Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa in which the AU assembly called for an
accelerated implementation of gender specific legal measures to combat HIV and
AIDS.66 Within the context of the skewed incidence and prevalence of HIV/AIDS
amongst women, this Declaration represents the need to accelerate efforts to make
drugs available to vulnerable populations.
Flowing from the above international and regional right to health framework,
it is inevitable to make the argument that at least, if a country can not afford the
skills, technology and means to produce ARVs and other drugs, they should make
61 Adopted at the 24-7 April 2001 summit in Abuja, Nigeria.




66 At the Third Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2004, the Heads of State and Government
adopted the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) See Para 1 of the
SDGEA. It is also arguable that the position of the African Union can be seen through its
resolutions in sessions of the AU and through its other organisations like NEPAD. NEPAD
has, however, been criticised for not embodying issues related to gender and HIV/AIDS.
The NEPAD document is available at http://www.nepad.org/AA0010101.pdf (accessed
12 July 2006). The NEPAD website http://www.nepad.org also contains other NEPAD texts such
as the communiqu6s, legal instruments and reports. For a critique on human rights in NEPAD,
see generally, E. Baimu, 'Human Rights in NEPAD and its Implications for the African Human
Rights System', 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, (2002): 301; S. Hiupekile Longwe,
'Assessment of Gender Orientation of NEPAD', available at http://dawn.thot.net/nepadl.html
(accessed 12 March 2008).
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effort to procure a means of making available the medicines to its citizens.67 In
recent times, within this argument, there has been the concomitant debate over
patent law in relation to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement, 1994) of the WTO.68 This regime will
be discussed in detail shortly in this paper. This debate has inevitably extended
to the best means to enable poor countries without sufficient manufacturing
capacity to make effective use of compulsory licensing provisions in order to
gain access to essential medicines.6 9 In this midst, some developing countries
have recently modified their patent laws to conform to the TRIPS standards, given
the 2016 deadline for developing countries.70 Safeguards to protect public health
have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement but practically speaking, most
governments in the sub Saharan African continent have been reluctant to exercise
such rights for fear of international trade and political ramifications, particularly
in the area of trade sanctions. 7' A report 72 shows that governments of developing
countries are not willing to be named as seeking to import generic versions of
patented drugs. This has been attributed to fear of censure. For example, Brazil
and Thailand were heavily criticised by the pharmaceutical industry as well as by
some governments when they used other flexibilities in TRIPS rules to suspend
patents on drugs for domestic public health programmes.
73
III. UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT,
DOHA DECLARATION, THE AUGUST 30 DECISION
AND HONG KONG AMENDMENT
On the strength of the above discussion, there is no doubt that HIV/AIDS and
access to ARVs is a critical human rights issue. This ushers in the need for
pharmaceutical industries to cooperate in order to make drugs available and
accessible. The fields of intellectual property and human rights have however
never been comfortable bedfellows. On the face of it, they could even work at
cross purposes. It is this relationship between strangers that has come to occupy
the debate between intellectual property regime and access to medicines. The two
subjects developed in virtual isolation from each other although in recent years,
international standard setting activities began to map their previously unchartered
67 See, generally, Mushayavanhu, supra note 10.
68 D. Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 2 nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell
(2003).
69 R. Mayne, 'The Global Campaign on Patents and Access to Medicines: An Oxfam Perspective',
in P. Drahos and R. Mayne (eds), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access, and
Development, Palgrave Macmillan (2003), pp. 244-58.
70 See para 7 of the Doha Declaration.
71 Cohen, supra note 7, 1.
72 International Centre for Sustainable Trade and Development, 'Rwanda Becomes First Country
To Try to use WTO Procedure to Import Patented Wiv/Aids Drugs', in Bridges Weekly Trade
News Digest, 11:27 (25 July 2007), available at http://ictsd.neti/news/bridgesweekly/7614/.
73 H. P. Hestermeyer, 'Canadian-made Drugs for Rwanda: The First Application of the WTO
Waiver on Patents and Medicines', International Economic Law Edition, 11: 28 (10 December
2007), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2007/12/insights071210.html.
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intersections.74 This relationship has been fought over with one view propounding
that human rights and intellectual property are fundamentally in conflict, " and the
other arguing that both areas are concerned with the same fundamental question
of defining the appropriate scope of private monopoly power that gives authors
and inventors a sufficient incentive to create and innovate, while ensuring that
the consuming public has adequate access to the fruits of their efforts.76 Indeed,
this divide has continued to characterise the trajectory of the two discourses as
evidenced in the TRIPS Agreement and its subsequent modifications. This tension
has also been expressed in the attempts so far to make use of the WTO system by
member countries. These will be discussed shortly.
Globally, recent developments seem to show that cheaper drugs are being made
available in developing countries due to a series of international initiatives and
support from developed countries such as the Global Fund, the United States (US)
government's President Emergency Plan Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the
Clinton Foundation which has been able to strike some deals with pharmaceutical
companies to sell HIV/AIDS drugs at a cheaper price in some developing
countries.7' It however remains to be seen whether developing countries can do
more, especially as balanced against trade and commercial interests. It is within
this context that the UN reported:
Globally, trade policy provisions need to be used more effectively
to increase access to care. The availability of low-cost generic
drugs needs to be expanded, in accordance with national laws and
international trade agreements and with a guarantee of their quality
... We need to find ways of more effectively using trade policy
provisions, such as compulsory licensing or parallel importation,
to increase access to care. The availability of low cost generic
drugs needs to be expanded, in accordance with national laws and
international trade agreements and with guarantees of their quality.78
A. TRIPS and patents
Simply put, patents are national rights, usually granted by the national patent
office, with effects only in the area for which they have been granted.79 Patents
74 L. R. Helfer 'Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?', available at
http://nilpr.umn.edu.
75 See Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Res. 2000/7, UN Sub-Comm'n
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 5 2nd Sess. Pmbl. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2007.
76 Helfer, supra note 74.
77 E. Durojaye 'Compulsory Licensing and Access to Medicines in post Doha Era: What hope
for Africa?' 55 Netherlands International Law Review (2008): 33-72; 35; L. Altman, 'Clinton
Group Gets Discount for AIDS Drugs', New York Times, 24 October 2003, p. 1, where it was
reported that the Foundation has struck a deal with some pharmaceutical companies to sell ARVs
at cheaper prices in some countries in Africa and the Caribbean.
78 Report of the UN Secretary General to the UN General Assembly meeting issued on 16 February
2001, UN Doc.A/55/779.
79 Hestermeyer, supra note 73.
Revisiting the Trips Regime 253
and intellectual property rights (IPRs) are, in general, used to give a certain
exclusionary right that can not otherwise be given to the owner of intangible
property on a competitive market.80 The inventor or owner is given this right since
the nature of the property otherwise allows it to be used by several manufacturers
at the same time, as the property is not individually appropriable. One of the
defences for this argument is the moral right an inventor has to use his own
invention.8'
The modern protection of intellectual property rights developed first as national
legislation in developed countries, followed by international agreements such
as the Paris Convention,8 2 the Berne Convention83 and other co-operations,
eventually leading to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS Agreement).84 It is important to note that the Paris Convention
excludes patenting of pharmaceutical products. The TRIPS Agreement is an
integral part of the World Trade Organisation agreements. It is considered the
most significant development in intellectual property in recent years alongside the
creation of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) at the Stockholm
Conference. Its regime prescribes a minimum level of patent protection that
WTO members must provide. It also provides for the members to grant patents
and the procedure to be followed.86 A patent on a product allows the patent-holder
to prevent third parties from 'making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing'
the product in the territory of the grant without its consent.87 To secure protection
of an invention in several countries, inventors must file for patents in all of them.
Pharmaceutical companies generally patent their inventions in all major markets.
The TRIPS Agreement also gave members some time to adapt their national
laws to the new standards.88 Currently, only members of least-developed countries
(LDCs) remain exempt from the obligation to grant pharmaceutical patents. 89
Patents generally allow inventors to sell their product at higher prices, creating an
incentive to invest in research and development. This became a threat for access to
medicines for poor countries.90 The issue was recognised by the WTO in its 2001
80 P Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, 3 rd edn (2001) at 13
(P Torremans, Intellectual Property Law).
81 S. Picciotto, 'Defending the Public Interest in TRIPS and the WTO', in P. Drahos and R.
Mayne (eds), Global Intellectual Property Rights - Knowledge, Access and Development (2002),
pp. 224-43; 225.
82 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883.
83 Berne Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1886.
84 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9.
85 Gervais, supra note 68.
86 Arts 27.1, 29, 33 of the TRIPS Agreement.
87 Art. 28.1 (a) TRIPS Agreement.
88 Art. 65.4 TRIPS Agreement.
89 Until 1 January 2016: Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to
Pharmaceutical Products, Doc. IP/C/25 (1 July 2002); Least-Developed Country Members -
Obligations under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical
Products, Doc. WT/L/478 (12 July 2002).
90 Hestermeyer, supra note 73.
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Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health.9' This tension will
be discussed in the next section of this paper.
The TRIPS Agreement also allows for a grant of a compulsory license. This is
a license granted by the government allowing the use of the invention without
the patent holder's authorisation. 92 The grant of compulsory licenses must be
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.93 The latter requirement may
be waived, for example, in times of national emergency. The waiver only applies
in the case of licenses granted to remedy anti-competitive practices. This provision
creates a problem for countries with insufficient manufacturing capacities for
drugs. Until recently, this usually meant importing the drug from India, which did
not grant product patent protection for drugs and is home to quality-assured drugs
produced in large volumes and affordable prices.94 India's ability to manufacture
the newest generation of drugs is now restricted as all developing countries have
to grant patent protection for new patentable drugs. A generic manufacturer thus
needs a compulsory license in its home country to produce and export a new,
patented drug. Such a 'compulsory license for export' is not permissible.
Until recently, the above exception had been considered by the WTO to
be sufficiently flexible to allow members to use a patented invention for the
purposes of promoting the public interest in matters of vital importance, such
as the protection of public health. However, in recent years, critics of TRIPS have
observed that while the flexibility to authorise non-consensual use of a patent is of
potential benefit to developed countries with domestic manufacturing capacity in
a particular field of technology, it is of limited benefit to countries with insufficient
or no such capacity. This is particularly problematic in the pharmaceutical field as
it prevents such countries from using TRIPS to address their often very substantial
public health problems. This problem is compounded by the fact that TRIPS also
requires that any non-consensual use of a patented invention be predominantly for
the supply of the domestic market of the country granting the authorisation. This
puts an obvious limit on the ability of countries with manufacturing capacity in
the pharmaceutical sector to authorize the manufacture of patented pharmaceutical
products for export to countries unable to manufacture their own.
Accompanying the above rigid provisions is the fact that the TRIPS Agreement
compared to earlier intellectual property agreements is subject to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism.96 Non-compliance with the treaty can be challenged
through this hard-edged system, in which rulings by the WTO panels and Appel-
late Body are backed by the threat of trade sanctions.97 It is therefore little wonder
91 Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 20 November 2001.
92 See art. 31 of the Agreement.
93 Art. 31 (f).
94 K. M. Bombach, 'Can South Africa fight AIDS? Reconciling the South Africa's Medicines and
Related Substances Act with the TRIPS Agreement', 19 Boston University International Law
Journal (2001): 289.
95 See art. 31(f) of the Agreement.
96 See Part V of the Agreement.
97 See Part V of the Agreement.
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that some scholars have described the agreement as having teeth.98 This provision,
as was later shown, became a deterrent to most developing countries' ability
to invoke compulsory licences.9 All the above issues led to the conclusion
that the TRIPS Agreement was a major tactical victory for rich countries and
pharmaceutical companies.' Its one-size-fits all approach has been widely
criticised for ignoring the obvious differences in capacities of countries.' The
above stringent rigours of the TRIPS were soon to provoke global concern.
Apprehension about the impact of the TRIPS Agreement began to grow in the late
1990s following the passing of South African Medicines and Related Substances
Control Amendments Act and the subsequent litigation by 39 multinational
pharmaceutical companies aimed at blocking implementation of certain of its
features. 112 The litigation was viewed as a misuse of the TRIPS to advance
the originator industry's grievances with generic substitution requirements, price
controls, and parallel importation. This litigation, alongside the conduct of the
United States and European Union trade authorities in pressuring South Africa to
refrain from taking steps that would interfere with the industry's pricing practices
and market advantage, became an eye opener to the concerns about the impact of
intellectual property rules on access to medicines particularly in the developing
world.1"3 This concern is made worse by the pandemic levels of H1V/AIDS in sub
Saharan Africa.
B. Doha Declaration
A general dissatisfaction amongst mainly less developed countries in sub-Saharan
Africa led to a challenge of the scope, interpretation and the application of the
TRIPS Agreement flexibilities. This led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public health (Doha Declaration) in 200104
The Doha set the stage for the reconsideration of many aspects of the TRIPS
including, the compulsory licensing provisions in order to accommodate those
countries that lack manufacturing capacity,"' pricing of medicine,"' access to
98 J. H. Reichman, 'The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?', 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2000): 441.
99 India, South Africa and Brazil opposed wealthy countries bringing shame as it was seen as greed
on the part of the North and its industry was killing millions of people in the South.
100 See M. A. Santoro, 'Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles Justifying Third
World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs', 31 North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation (2006): 923, 926.
101 Mushayavanhu, supra note 10, 145.
102 Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa and others: New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Limited v
Minister of Health and another: Tshabalala-Msimang NO and Another 542/04, 543/04.
103 Meeting Report: Access to Medicines and Intellectual Property: An International Expert Meeting
on Canada's Access to Medicines Regime, Global Developments, and New Strategies for
Improving Access, 19-21 April, 2007, Ottawa, Canada.
104 WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, WTO/MIN




medicines,0 7 and reiterated the right of WTO members to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme emergency.
Even more, the Doha Declaration gives least developed countries until 2016 to
provide for patent protection for their pharmaceutical products.0 8 In addition,
developed countries are under the obligation to assist developing countries in
technology and skills transfer. 9 The Doha Declaration further reaffirms member
states commitment to flexibilities under the TRIPS, for example, compulsory
licensing." The use of compulsory licensing should promote access to generic
medicines through local production by allowing a government agency or a private
company to manufacture pharmaceutical products in the public interest without
the patent holder's consent."' Compulsory licensing is a policy tool that can
be adopted to address situations where the price of drugs is beyond the reach
of poor people, or where there is a need to promote technology transfer and
establish a technological base, especially by countries that have insufficient or
inadequate manufacturing capacity. The Declaration also recognises the gravity
of the public health problems affecting many developing and least developed
countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, among others." 2 It can
therefore be safely said that the Doha Declaration came after TRIPS as an
assurance that human rights principles would inform the interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement.
Compulsory licensing, interpreted within the parlance of the Doha Declaration,
should go a good way in alleviating the issue of inaccessibility to ARV drugs and
other drugs. However, most countries on the subcontinent have obsolete patent
laws modeled along colonial lines. These laws do not comply with or make use
of possibilities under TRIPS. This is not helped by the insufficient manufacturing
capacities of most developing countries. Hence, with regard to making use of
the TRIPS flexibilities, one of the important aspects of the Doha Declaration is
Paragraph 6 which obligated the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution
to the problem of WTO member countries with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. This has led to the WTO General Council
Decision which is discussed next.
C. WTO General Council Decision 2003
The WTO General Council Decision of August 30 2003 on the implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
(briefly known as the 30 August Decision/Waiver Decision) allows member
107 WTO: 2001.
108 Para 7 of the Declaration.
109 Para 7 of the Declaration.
110 Para 5. Other flexibilities under the TRIPS include parallel importation and the provisions for
early working (also known as the Bolar provision).
111 It also promotes competition policies to remedy anti-competitive practices and patent abuse,
thereby lowering the prices of medicines; See, generally, S. K. Sell, 'Trade Issues and
HIV/AIDS', 20 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2001-2): 481, 513.
112 Para 1 of the Declaration.
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countries to authorise someone other than the patent holder to manufacture a
lower cost version of a patented drug or medical device for export to developing
countries that do not have the capacity to manufacture such products. The decision
was meant to facilitate access to medicines in developing countries and was
the outcome of intense and detailed two year multilateral negotiations.113 By
that decision, WTO members agreed to waive certain obligations in the TRIPS
Agreement which were thought to be a potential barrier to effective responses to
health emergencies.114 The main provision of the decision waives the obligations
of WTO members under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement for compulsory
licenses to produce and export pharmaceutical products to eligible importing
members for public health problems." 5 In effect, the decision allows members
with pharmaceutical manufacturing capability to amend their patent laws to permit
the non-consensual use of patented inventions to manufacture and export the
pharmaceutical products required by other members to respond to their public
health problems, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis,
and other epidemics. Thus, the waiver was meant to make it easier for poorer
countries to obtain cheaper generic versions of patented medicines by setting aside
a provision of the TRIPS Agreement that could hinder exports of pharmaceuticals
manufactured under compulsory licences to countries that are unable to produce
them.
D. The Hong Kong Amendment
On 6 December 2005, WTO members approved changes to the intellectual
property agreement making permanent the 30 August Decision.1 6 The decision
directly transforms the 30 August 2003 'waiver' into a permanent amendment of
113 Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declarationon
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doc. IP/N/10/CAN/i (8 October 2007).
114 Minutes of Meeting. Held in the Centre William Rappard on 25, 26 and 30 August 2003, Doc.
WT/GC/MI82 (13 November 2003) paras 29 et seq. Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doc. WT/L/540 (2 September
2003). The Decision is a waiver under art. IX WTO Agreement, even though its content at times
oversteps the content of a waiver and comes close to an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.
115 To put the mechanism into operation, the importing member must notify the WTO's Council for
TRIPS of the name and expected quantity of the product, confirm that it has established that it has
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for the product in question (unless it is an LDC), and
confirm that it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory license if the product is patented in
its territory. The exporting member can then issue a compulsory license limited to the quantity of
the drug necessary for the notifying importing member with the whole production going to that
member. It must require the beneficiary to identify the drugs to prevent re-imports, e.g. by adding
a special color, and to post quantities and distinguishing features of the drug on a website before
shipment begins. Several importing members can pool as importers. The exporting member has
to notify the Council for TRIPS of the grant of the license and its conditions. The notifications
by importing and exporting Members do not need approval by the WTO. The mechanism is
subject to an annual review by the Council for TRIPS. As compulsory licenses for export are
granted under national law, exporting members are required to amend their patent laws for the
mechanism to work. Several members have done so, albeit not in a uniform manner.
116 WTO press release, 'Members OK Amendment to make Health Flexibility Permanent'
(6 December 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm.
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the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). The amendment is designed to match the 2003 waiver as closely as
possible. As of March 2008, only 13 countries have supported the Hong Kong
Amendment.'17 It is important to bear in mind that Rwanda, on behalf of the Africa
Group, has been critical of the Hong Kong Amendment." 8
IV. MANOEUVRING THE WTO DECISION TERRAIN: CANADA ADOPTS THE
JEAN CHRETIEN PLEDGE TO AFRICA ACT, RWANDA NOTIFIES THE WTO
A negligible number of developed countries and regional groups have established
domestic regimes to implement the WTO General Council Decision 2003. In
North America, Canada established the Jean Chritien Pledge to Africa Act 2004.
The European Union has issued a directive regulating the export of generic
pharmaceutical drugs. 9 The Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway have also
established national regimes. In Asia, India, China and South Korea have all
developed legislative measures to allow for the export of pharmaceutical drugs
in order to address public health concerns. It is also important to note that while
these countries have been making effort to be in tune with the WTO Decision,
others have remained outrageously resistant to the move, notably, the United
States of America, Japan and Australia. 120 Globally, some of the ginger groups that
have pushed the access to medicine agenda include India, Brazil, South Africa,
Thailand and China. This has come with repercussions as demonstrated in the
case of Thailand. In 2006 and 2007, Thailand received a critical notice from the
United States Trade Representative in its Special 301 Report, and the threat of a
boycott of products from Abbott Laboratories, as well as widespread outrage from
members of the brand-name pharmaceutical industry when she issued compulsory
licences in respect of, inter alia, ARVs.
121
As previously indicated, states can engage in procurement of ARVs as a means
to make available AIDS drugs. This is particularly important for most sub Saharan
African countries, which are not endowed with the means to produce medicines
locally. The positive duty to fulfill and promote availability of AIDS drugs would
therefore involve efforts like negotiating with other governments or public and
private entities producing drugs. Taking benefit of the TRIPS regime comes along
with the obligation to be TRIPS compliant, by, for example, passing patent laws in
line with the regime. On the African continent, research shows that at the time of
the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement, Angola and Malawi were among the
117 Including the United States, Switzerland, El Salvador, South Korea, Norway, India, Philippines,
Israel, Japan, Australia, Singapore, China and the European Union.
118 S. Shashikant, 'Heated Discussions as TRIPS and Health Deadline is Missed' (6 April
2005). South Development Monitor SUNS 5772, Geneva, available at http://www.cptech.org/
ip/wto/suns04042005.html.
119 Rimmer, supra note 2, p. 90.
120 The United States administration of George W. Bush has instead pursued a course of bilateral and
regional free trade agreements to raise the levels of patent protection of pharmaceutical drugs in
a range of jurisdictions.
121 Government of Canada (2007: 32-3).
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countries in sub Saharan Africa that excluded the patentability of pharmaceutical
products. 122 There have however been some recent developments although patent
law generally remains obsolete in the sub continent.
123
The first country to implement the WTO August 30 Decision was Canada.
124
She entered into the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation in
1994. It was therefore part of the process leading to both the Doha Declaration
and the August 30 Decision. In light of these developments, in September 2003,
Stephen Lewis challenged the Government of Canada to amend its patent law to
give poor countries devastated by AIDS a cheap source for drugs. 125 He made
a plea to Canada as a major industrial country, and one of the G7 countries to
announce the manufacture and export of generic drugs to Africa.126 He concluded
that 'If a major Western government would undertake the simple legislative
amendment allowing for the production and export of generic anti-retrovirals,
it would make a tremendous difference for Africa' .127 This was also amidst
campaigns in the country by other ginger groups like M6decins Sans Fronti6res
and the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network. Less than 2 months later, Canada
announced the introduction of a new Bill to provide for low cost drugs to fight
AIDS in developing countries. The proposed law was dubbed - An Act to amend
the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act - the Jean Chrdtien Pledge to
Africa Act 2004 (Canada). 128 The Jean Chrdtien Pledge to Africa Act provides
for compulsory licences to authorise the manufacture and export of an eligible
drug or medical device to an eligible country.
A. Canada enacts a Medicines Regime
In May 2004, in a bid to implement the August 30 Decision, Canada adopted
a detailed legislative framework referred to as 'Canada's Access to Medicines
Regime' (CAMR or Regime). 129 It has become a classic example, demonstrating
how developed countries can use their mechanisms to benefit Low and Middle
Income Countries (LMICs). With the implementation of the Use of Patented
Products for International Humanitarian Purposes Regulations, Canada became
122 WIPO 2000: 36.
123 For patent law developments on some African countries, see, generally, Mushayavanhu, supra
note 10.
124 Canada had been at the forefront of the WTO processes.
125 Rimnimer, supra note 119, p. 91.
126 S. Lewis (2003) 'The Politics of Resource Allocation. Statement by United Nation Secretary
General's Special Envoy on HIV/AIDS', Nairobi, Kenya, available at http://www.awcfs.org/
Icasa/DayFive/StephenLewis4.htm (accessed 30 July 2008).
127 S. Nolen, 'Spearhead AIDS Fight, UN Envoy Tells Canada'. Globe and Mail, 25 September 2003
A,1. See also Rimmer, supra note 114, p. 9 1.
128 SC 2004, c 23. Available at www.canlii.org/ca/as/2004/c23. Jean Chrdtien was enthusiastic in
this area. The name was in his honour.
129 On 14 May 2004, the Jean Chr6tien Pledge to Africa Act (formerly Bill C-9) received Royal
Assent. This legislation amended the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act to provide the
framework enabling Canada to respond to a decision of 30 August 2003 of the General Council
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
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one of the first countries to permit the grant of authorisations to Canadian
pharmaceutical manufacturers who wish to supply countries having inadequate or
no pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities with lower-cost versions of patented
pharmaceutical products. This law enables Canada to export generic medicines to
eligible countries that cannot produce them.
What is further important to note about this law is that it departed from the
WTO's position. The August 30 Decision is between member countries of the
WTO and does not apply to countries not party to the organisation. Nevertheless,
Canada chose to implement the decision in a manner that enables both developing
and least developed non-WTO member countries to participate as importers of
eligible patented pharmaceutical products. 30 The amendment came into force
in May 2005.3 It imposes a number of conditions for obtaining a compulsory
license for export, including the conditions of the 2003 WTO decision but also
additional ones.
The law has been described as less permissive than some of the other national
regimes. 3 2 A review of its scheme noted:'33
Canada's Access to Medicines Regime contains a number of measures
that have not been emulated elsewhere. These include its reliance
on pre approved lists of products eligible for export and countries
eligible to import them and making the grant of an export licence
contingent upon the health and safety review of the product by
the exporting authority. In addition, whereas many other regimes
waive the requirement that a pharmaceutical manufacturer request a
voluntary licence, in cases of a national emergency or circumstances
of extreme urgency, Canada's Access to Medicines Regime does not.
The CAMR is meant to allow generic drug companies in Canada to produce
and export lower-cost versions of brand-name drugs to developing countries.
It provides a way for the world's developing and least-developed countries
130 A WTO member country must notify the WTO, which will post a notice on a dedicated WTO
website. That notice must identify the name and the quantity of the required product and, if the
product is protected by a domestic patent, indicate the member's intention to grant authorisation
to use the invention pertaining to the product in question. Unless the importing member is a
least developed country, the notice must also contain a declaration by that member that it has no
or insufficient capacity to manufacture the required product. On the other hand, consideration
by Canada for any non-WTO country seeking to import pharmaceutical products under the
regime requires written notice to the government of Canada through diplomatic channels and
is conditional upon agreement to specific criteria. Least developed country (LDC): government
would be required to formally state that it will not import licensed products for commercial
purposes, and that it will adopt measures consistent with the August 30th decision to prevent
re-exportation of pharmaceutical products to other countries. Developing country: in addition to
the above LDC requirements, the country must also qualify for official development assistance
according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The
country must also formally state that it is experiencing substantially the same conditions under
which developing country WTO members on Schedule 4 may import licensed pharmaceutical
products (e.g. urgent circumstances and insufficient manufacturing capacity).
131 §21.04(3)(c) Patent Act.
132 Rimmer, supra note 2, p. 92.
133 Government of Canada (2008), available at http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/index/ e.html.
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to import high-quality drugs and medical devices at a lower cost to treat the
diseases that bring suffering to their citizens. It is one part of the Government of
Canada's broader strategy to assist countries in their struggle against HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other diseases.3 Canada's Access to Medicines
Regime provides a framework within which eligible countries can import less
expensive generic versions of patented drugs and medical devices. All products
exported under the Regime must meet the same rigorous requirements for safety,
effectiveness and quality as those authorised for the Canadian market. The law
therefore seeks to reconcile both commercial and humanitarian goals.135
To use the Regime, eligible countries must make an arrangement with
pharmaceutical companies based in Canada. Non-governmental organisations can
help countries to obtain and distribute drugs and medical devices through the
Regime and can also obtain and distribute generic drugs on their own. Eligible
countries may be able to obtain funding to support their purchase of medicines,
although not directly through CAMR. The legislation upon which the Regime is
based lists the pharmaceutical products eligible for export. These include drugs to
treat HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases. There are also measures
in place for adding to the list of eligible products.
The road towards the first application of the mechanism was tussled by MSF,
an international humanitarian organisation, and Apotex, a giant Canadian generic
drug manufacturer, headquartered in Toronto. MSF committed itself to test the
new law as a would-be purchaser of a generic product from Apotex. Apotex
has been interested in the supply of generic drugs. 3 6 At MSF's request, Apotex,
which had been interested in the supply of generic pharmaceutical drugs for a
mixture of philanthropic and commercial reasons, developed TriAvir, a single,
fixed-dose combination drug that helps treat people living with HIV/AIDS.'37
Apo-Triavir combines three patented brand-name drugs: zidovudine, lamivudine
and nevirapine. This was developed with the view of potentially exporting it
under a compulsory license to one or more developing countries. The national
drug regulatory authority, confirmed that the product met the necessary standards
required by Canadian law, a precondition of export. The product was subsequently
approved by the 'Prequalification Programme' of the World health Organisation
(WHO), thus providing some certainty to potential purchasers that the product and
the manufacturer meet accepted standards.'38 This process took several years.
134 Ibid.
135 The CAMR complements other humanitarian efforts by the government of Canada to assist least-
developed and developing countries in responding to public health problems.
136 The company is a veteran of patent litigation with brand-name pharmaceutical companies. It
has been involved in numerous law suits in the Canadian courts, notably the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. 2002 SCC (CanLIl).
137 Apotex (2003). Apotex has been involved in numerous law suits in the Canadian courts - most
notably, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. 2002
SCC 77 (CanLII).
138 For more information about the WHO Prequalification Programme, see http://mednet3.who.
int/prequel.
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B. Rwanda navigates the waters of Canada's Medicines Regime
In the midst of the above quagmire, in a pioneer move, Rwanda notified the
WTO of its intention to import ARV drugs from Canada. 39 This was the first
test of the waters of the WTO August 30 Decision and the CAMR. 40 This was
four years after the Decision. A country with a population of about 9.4 million
people, Rwanda is one of the countries which collectively represent approximately
50 per cent of HIV infections worldwide. 14i Rwanda has national mechanisms
in place like the Rwanda National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan (2006-2009), the
HIV/AIDS Treatment and Care Plan (2003-2007), the National Prevention Plan
and has established a Ministry in charge of HIV/AIDS and Other Epidemics
in Rwanda.142 Currently, Rwanda faces a generalised epidemic, with an HIV
prevalence rate of 3.1 per cent among adults aged 15 to 49. The prevalence rate
has remained relatively stable, with an overall decline since the late 1990s, partly
due to improved HIV surveillance methodology. 143 In general, HIV prevalence
is higher in urban areas than in rural areas, and women are at higher risk of
HIV infection than men. Young women aged 15 to 24 are twice as likely to be
infected with HIV as young men in the same age group. 14 4 Populations at higher
risk of HIV infection include sex workers and men attending clinics for sexually
transmitted infections. 1
45
Rwanda is among the world's least developed countries, ranking 158 of 177 in
the United Nations Development Program's 2006 Human Development Index.
14 6
Some 60 per cent of the population lives in poverty. During the genocide in
1994, mass rape, sexual torture and psychological trauma were rife. Massive
population flow following the genocide has resulted in an increase in the urban
population. The country also faces a shortage of human resources throughout the
health sector. Some of the Rwandans killed or displaced during the genocide,
included a disproportionate number of highly skilled doctors, nurses and other
health workers. 147 Many health centers lack essential physical facilities, equipment
and supplies. 148 The country's state of health is therefore suffering.
In order for a country to fully benefit from the TRIPS Agreement, it has to
put in place legislation to benefit from a better and negotiated status for least
139 See notification (IP/N/9/RWA/1), filed on 19 July 2007.
140 Kaiser Daily HIV and Aids Report, 'WTO Receives Notification From Canada Authorizing
Generic Drug Company To Produce Combination Antiretroviral for Rwanda', 09 October
2007. Available at http://www.kaisemetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=&DRID=
48039.
141 UNAIDS, Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (2008).
142 WHO, Summary Country Profile on HIV/AIDS Treatment Scale-up - Rwanda (2008).
143 UNAIDS, supra note 3.
144 Ibid.
145 WHO, Summary Country Profile on HIV/AIDS Treatment Scale-up - Rwanda (2008).
146 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (2006).
147 WHO, supra note 140.
148 Electricity supply is erratic throughout Rwanda, impacting hospitals, health centres and
laboratories. Blood safety, data management and drug storage are all impacted by the erratic
electricity supply.
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developed countries and flexibilities. Rwanda is a party to the World Intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO) Convention, the constituent instrument of the
organisation since 1984.149 Rwanda has an observer status with the African
Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) and is, hence, no party to
different treaties and conventions regulated by the Organisation. 5 ' Like most sub
Saharan African countries, Rwanda applies a dualist approach to international law.
The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda states that:
Peace treaties and treaties or agreements relating to trade and
international organisations and those which commit state finances,
modify provisions of laws already adopted by Parliament or relate
to the status of individuals, can only be ratified after authorisation by
Parliament.'5
In effect, in order for the TRIPS Agreement to take legal effect in Rwanda,
the country will have to domesticate it through a national legislation. Rwanda
has adhered to the TRIPS Agreement but has not complied with most of
the requirements so far. The main law regarding pharmaceutical production in
Rwanda is the Law on Pharmaceutical Art.5 2 Rwanda does not have a drug
authority.'53 Patents are recognised in Rwanda by a law on patents1 14 enacted in
1963 and a ministerial decree putting in application the law on patents.155 Under
this law, the Minister of Commerce, Industry, Investment Promotion, Tourism
and Cooperatives determines the conditions to be followed by whoever seeks
a patent registration and protection for his invention. There are three types of
patents in Rwanda: invention patents, import patents and improvement patents, all
of which have a lifespan of 20 years. Whoever seeks any sort of patent makes
an application to the Minister of Commerce, Industry, Investment Promotion,
Tourism and Cooperatives. The application is accompanied by a full description of
the invention, the drawings, patters or samples necessary for a full understanding
149 Rwanda adhered to the WIPO Convention by Law no. 16/1983 of 18/08/1983(OGRR, 1983,
p. 667). The instrument was signed at Stockholm on 14 July 1967 and entered into force in
1970 and was amended in 1979.
150 The objectives of the Organisation, as enshrined in Article III of the Lusaka Agreement, show
that, cooperation in industrial property is intended to achieve technological advancement for
economic and industrial development of the member states. Details on ARIPO are available at
www.aripo.org.
151 Art. 189, al.2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, OGRR, Year 42, special no, June
04th, 2003. See also Art. 190.
152 Loi no 06/1988 du 12 f~vrier 1988 portant Organisation des Socits Commerciales (Official
Gazette, 1988, p. 437), also found in Codes et Lois du Rwanda, 2 nd edn (1995), Vol. 1, pp.352-73.
See articles 32 to 38.
153 D. P. Chiwandamira and D. Kemannzi, Analysis of Legal Aspects of Local Pharmaceutical
Production in Rwanda. A study commissioned by Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation
and Development (2006).
154 Loi du 25 f~vrier 1963 sur les brevets (Official Gazette, 1963, p.148) also found in Codes etLois
du Rwanda, 2nd edn, V.III, pp. 1564-6.
155 Arrt&6 Minist6riel no 5/10/67 du 5/10/1967 portant mesures d'excution de la Loi sur les Brevets
(Official Gazette, 1967, p. 214).
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of the invention, and a summary detailing in a precise manner what constitutes the
novelty or originality of the invention.
15 6
V. WHY THE DEAL STALLED: THE BUREAUCRATIC FETTERS WITHIN
THE WTO DECISION AND THE CAMR
The notification of the WTO was the first in several steps that had to be taken
before the affordable drugs reach patients in Rwanda. This is because, first,
Apotex had to acquire a licence to produce the medicine Rwanda wants to import.
This meant negotiations with nine patent holders. Fixed-dose medications, which
combine multiple drugs in a single pill, make treatment regimes simpler and thus
easier to expand to more patients. When Apotex agreed to produce the ARV
in the fixed-dose combination (FDC), a first line drug, it was not listed as a
product eligible for compulsory licensing for export in Schedule 1 of the Patents
Act.'57 In order to add this drug to the list, a decision of the Federal Cabinet is
required, following the recommendation of both the Minister of Industry and the
Minister of Health. After pressure, the Cabinet made the requisite order amending
the Schedule to include TriAvir. The application was then submitted to Health
Canada for approval. This process took 7 months. Further, TriAvir is a fixed-dose
combination of the patented ARVdrugs zidovudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine.
Patents on the components are held by GlaxoSmithKline and German-based
B oehringer Ingelheim.'58 GlaxoSmithKline, Shire and Boehringer Ingelheim each
put forward numerous conditiond for issuing a voluntary licence. In the end,
Glasko-SmithKline and Shire did not oppose the application, but chose not to
grant a voluntary licence. This then required Apotex to make an application under
Canada's Acess to Medicines Regime. Boehringer Ingelheim was also reticent
to freely grant a licence. It was only after gaining regulatory approval of Health
Canada that Apotex obtained a compulsory licence in 2007 to export the triple
combination HIV/AIDS drug to Rwanda.'59
Other requirements under the 30 August Decision include: specifications
relating to name and address of the licensee, the product(s) for which the licence
has been granted, the country or countries to which the product(s) is (are) to be
supplied and the duration of the licence. Also, the address of the website of which
the licensee posts its required notifications has to be provided.16 The Decision
also requires special branding and packaging labels for drugs produced for export
under the Decision to prevent diversion of goods. Clearly, there are so many
superfluous rigours to go past before the deal can kick off.
156 Chiwandamira et al., supra note 153, p. 18.
157 RSC 1985.
158 GlaxoSmithKilne held several relevant patents (including Canada Patent Nos 2,068,790,
2,070,230, 2,286,126 and 2, 311,988). The Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals Inc. held the
Canada Patent No. 2, 030,056.
159 Rimmer, supra note 119, p. 93.
160 30 August Decision, supra note 111, para 2 ( c ). See also Shashikant, supra note 118.
Revisiting the Trips Regime 265
The stringency of the August 30 Decision naturally gave birth to a rigid
Canadian law. The Regime is fettered by rigours and needs remedying. 16' About
the CAMR, Richard Elliott identifies that there is a need to eliminate limits on the
products that are subject to compulsory licensing because currently, the legislative
provisions constituting the CAMR include a limited list of pharmaceutical
products, consisting primarily of drugs on the WHO's Model List of Essential
Medicines plus most of the other ARV drugs then under patent in Canada.
162
Further, the mechanism also bears discriminatory aspects in that it has double-
standards against non-WTO countries. 63 The CAMR takes all 'least developed
countries' and all developing countries belonging to the WTO as potentially
eligible importers of Canadian-made generics. It however creates unjustifiable
hurdles for developing countries that are not members of the WTO and that are
not 'least developed countries'. Thus, in order to be added to the list of eligible
importers of Canadian-made generics, a non-WTO developing country must
declare 'an emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,' and must also
agree that the imported product will not be used for 'commercial purposes' - a
vague and undefined term capable of being interpreted as interference with dis-
tribution of the product in the importing country through private, for-profit
pharmacies.
164
Another intrinsic barrier within the Canadian law relates to non-governmental
organisations (NGO) procurement. The law requires that an NGO purchasing
Canadian-made generics for importation into an eligible country must have the
'permission' of the country. 'Permission' is not defined. 165 Rather, it is suggested
that the importing countries should be notified by the Government of Canada of
any application under the CAMR system made on their behalf. 166 In this regard, it
is argued that if a scenario ever arises that an NGO is able and actively seeking to
access the CAMR system on behalf of an importing country and, that importing
country government objects to these actions, the importing country government
could challenge this application with its own application to the CAMR or with
notification of its intentions to apply to the CAMR. 167 Given the pivotal role that
NGOs play in many low and middle income countries, this provision becomes
161 See R. Elliot, 'Delivery Past Due: Global Precedent set under Canada's Access to Medicines
Regime', 13 (1) HIVIAIDS Policy & Law Review (2008): 7. K. R. Sirinivas, 'Interpreting
Paragraph 6 Deal on Patents and Access to Treatment', Economic and Political Weekly,
20 September 2003; J. Love, 'CPTech Statement on WTO Deal on Exports of Medicines'
(30 August 2003), available at www.cptech.org/ip/wto/ptech08302003.html (accessed 19 July
2008).
162 See Canada's Patent Act, Schedule 1, at http://Ilaws.justice.gc.ca/enlshowdoc/cs/P-4/sc:l//
en#anchorsc: 1.
163 Elliot, supra note 161, p 7.
164 Ibid.
165 Elliot, supra note 161, p. 8.
166 A report by The AIDS in Africa Working Group and Access to Drugs Initiative entitled 'Making
Canada's Access to Medicines Regime Work for Countries in Need: A Case Study on Ghana'.
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, International Human Rights Program (January 2007),
available at http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/review-reviser/camr rcam ut.stu_05-eng.pdf.
167 Ibid.
266 Rebecca Amollo
more restraining than enabling to NGOs seeking to urge governments to provide
ARVs.
Other concerns raised in regard to the law are the rigorous requirement of
Health Canada's approval as the only acceptable one. There is also the requirement
of advance disclosure of the importing country, which may result in pressures
from the patent holders and any government against the use of compulsory
licensing; negotiations for voluntary licences in urgent situations, arbitrary two-
year time limit on compulsory licences; issues relating to option for re-exportation
from importing country within regional trading bloc and extra opportunities
for ligation by patent holders.'68 The Canadian law is also out of touch with
realities of international drug procurement regimes relating to a public tendering
process. This increases the gulf between manufacturers of drug products and
the international funding required to pay for medicines. 169 Further, the CAMR
espouses an unnecessary provision which is inhibitive to a Canadian company
wishing to apply for a licence as it requires a licence applicant to specify 'the
name of the government person or entity, or the person or entity permitted by
the government of the importing country, to which the product is to be sold, and
prescribed information, if any, concerning that person or entity." 170 Experiences of
Brazil, South Africa and Thailand show that this simply opens up the importing
entity to attack from antagonists of compulsory licences. This may even be worse
for a least developed country.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
The protracted struggle to make use of the CAMR points to some critical issues
for consideration with regard to developing countries accessing ARV drugs from
developed countries. Some of the questions and issues therein are: Is the WTO
General Council Decision a solution? Are developing countries doing enough to
make it easier for developed countries to import drugs from their jurisdictions?
Are pharmaceutical companies honouring their TRIPS obligations in terms
of human rights and public health? Are African governments doing enough
to take advantage of the TRIPS regime? Are African governments exploring
other avenues and addressing the intricate barriers? Can we move past market
dominance?
The first application of the mechanism shows that it is too cumbersome to
work effectively. Considering that developed countries are under the obligation
to assist developing countries in technology and skills transfer under the Doha
Declaration, 171 it has been argued that there are better opportunities for developing
countries to scale up treatment for their citizens if they are allowed to effectively
invoke the flexibility provisions contained in the TRIPS Agreement, particularly
168 Elliot, supra note 161, p. 9.
169 For further shortcomings of the CAMR, see Elliot, supra note 161.
170 See section 21.04(2) (f) of the CAMR.
171 See para 7.
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compulsory licensing. But with limited resources and high cost of drugs,
particularly for second-line drugs for HIV/AIDS treatment, only a few can be
accessed. There have been suggestions that the CAMR needs to be reformed to
cater for standard international procurement methods, which are considered to
be more objective, transparent, and efficient than direct negotiation. This would
bring it in tune with the WTO's interagency Guidelines, accepted by the Global
Fund.172 Elliot 173 and Rimmer 174 have also suggested areas of reform in this regard.
The process proved cumbersome and the generic manufacturer has few incentives
to go through with it. It is economically imprudent to produce for merely one
importing country, and it is difficult to convince countries to notify the WTO of
their need to import. Additionally, Canada imposes a maximum term of two years
for the compulsory license, not enough to recoup the investment for producing
a generic drug. The mechanisms are not commensurate to the need and defy
expediency.
The alternative has also been entertained that Rwanda could have imported a
similar combination drug from India, also known as the 'pharmacy of the poor',
which is available at $0.14 per tablet 175 and not yet affected by India's new patent
legislation. 7 6 India supplies about half the generic drugs in Africa.17 7 If this was
the case, Rwanda would only have had to impose a compulsory license in its own
territory, and possibly not even need this step, as it is not clear whether any of the
nine inventions have been patented in Rwanda. Apotex itself concluded that the
mechanism would have to be changed to work effectively.'78
In order for developing countries to take advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities,
the first step is that they should adopt a legal and policy framework that
allows for compulsory licensing and limited exceptions. The advantage is that
these flexibilities, together with the provisions of the Doha Declaration, are self
executing and need to be domesticated. If sub Saharan African countries have
to benefit from the process, efforts must be galvanized to bring patent laws up
to standard to meet the demand. This will require political enthusiasm and legal
and judicial activism. Countries like Brazil, India and Thailand had to go through
worse times to reap the benefit. Hiding heads in the sand by African states for fear
of sanctions is a disservice because the need for ARVs is not retreating; neither is
the epidemic showing signs of abating.
172 Guide to the Global Fund's Policies on Procurement and Supply Management, available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/pdf/guidelines/pp-guidelines-procurement-supplymanagement-
en.pf.
173 Elliott, supra note 161.
174 Rimmer, supra note 2.
175 A. Attaran, 'AIDS Drugs Fiasco a Tale of Red Tape', Toronta Star (9 August 2007). Rwanda had
in the past imported low-cost medicines from India and Brazil.
176 Chan Park of the Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit in India, available at http://www.cptech.
orglip/health/c/india/.
177 Guardian Unlimited ( Special Reports), 'Cheap AIDS Drugs under Threat', available at
www.guardian .co.uk/aids/story/0,7369,00.html (accessed 20 August 2008).
178 Apotex, Life Saving AIDS Drug for Africa Gets Final Clearance, Press Release (21 September
2007).
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Other suggestions include: a 'one-licence solution' strategy which authorises a
generic company with a single licence to multiple countries, without requiring
advance notification, pre-determined quantities of the product, and a separate
country for each single drug order. Local manufacturing has also been suggested
if human and technological capacity is scaled up. A cost-benefit analysis should
be done by most countries considering local production and more aggressive
technology transfer. Other measures include administrative, knowledge and
other existing barriers should also be addressed through obtaining support
from developed countries and/or international organisations on the effective
implementation of compulsory licensing. Policy reform in the area of tax, tariff
and mark-ups to determine what changes could facilitate more affordable prices
for the population has also been suggested. All policy choices must be informed
by local circumstances and context.
VII. CONCLUSION
Expediency is core to accessibility and availability of drugs within the context of
the right to health.179 Both the WTO Decision and the CAMR are not offering
solutions so far. Clearly, the Rwanda-Apotex deal cast doubt on the efficacy
of the WTO General Council Decision. It is little wonder that it has been
described as 'a gift bound in red tape'. 80 The MSF described the WTO system
as 'neither expeditious, nor a solution'.181 The deal also reeks of the influence of
neoliberalism and market economies. Like Richard Elliott observed: 'The market
does not respond to the needs of poor people.., they are not a big draw for
pharmaceutical producers because they don't have money'.182 Given the defects
of the mechanism, the Director General of the European Generic Medicines
Association concluded at a hearing of the European Parliament that it is unlikely
that any company in Europe would make use of the mechanism.'83 It is therefore
imprudent for WTO and its mechanism to talk about 'public goods' problems with
a 'private market' solution.184 The TRIPS largely entrenched a system of market
179 See CESCR General Comment 3 (para 2) on the nature of state obligations (art. 2 of the
Covenant). It explains that steps have to be within a reasonably short time; C. Corea, 'Recent
International Developments in the Area of Intellectual Property Rights', ICSTD-UNCTD
Dialogue, 2 nd Bellagio Series on Development and Intellectual Property, 18-21 September 2003.
180 See 'Joint NGO Statement on TRIPS and Public Health WTO Deal on Medicines: A "gift"
Bound in Red Tape' (10 September 2003), available at http://www.cptech.orglip/wto/p6/
ngos09102003.html.
181 M6decins Sans Fronti~res, Neither Expeditious, nor a Solution: The WTO August 3oth Decision
is Unworkable, available at http://www.msf.ch/fileadminluser-upload/uploads/communiques/
images_2006/pdf/cameNeither expeditious nor a solution_-_August_30 and the JCPA_
single-page.pdf.
182 A. Silversides, 'Not a Single Pill', Ottawa Citizen, 13 August 2006.
183 Presentation by Greg Perry to the European Parliament's Mini-Hearing on TRIPS and Access to
Medicines, 5 July 2007, Brussels.
184 F. M. Abbott and J. H. Reichman, 'Strategies for the Protection and Promotion
of Public Health Arising Out of the WTO TRIPS Agreement Amendment Process',
available at http://www.who.int/phi/public-hearings/second/contributions-sectionl/Sectionl-
Abbott&Reichman.pdf.
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dominance and sheer protectionism. The rigours of the WTO Decision led Love
to conclude that it is an endorsement of a new model of explicit protectionism:
The U.S, Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and other developed
economies will be allowed to bar imports from developing country
generic suppliers - under completely irrational protectionist measures
that are defended by the WTO Secretariat and its most powerful
members as a humanitarian gesture.'85
It would be safe to conclude that the lack of expedition accompanying the
Rwanda - Apotex deal points to a few things: developing countries are yet to grow
under the TRIPS and its system; developed countries are not necessarily keen on
the transfer of technology to developing countries, the manufacture, production
and availability of ARVs is still left to the mercy of market forces as influenced
by neo-liberal trends with the result that drugs are still largely unaffordable and
inaccessible. The transition period may as well have to be further extended, or
the requirement of protection of pharmaceuticals done away with altogether as
suggested that a moratorium be set on further intellectual property standard setting
exercise in order to give the incipient transnational system of innovation, triggered
by TRIPS, time to breathe and grow. 86 A recent report18 7 shows that Apotex has
undertaken to ship seven million antiretroviral pills to Rwanda to treat 21,000
patients for one year but added that it will not participate in the program in the
future unless the government corrects the law to alleviate some of the problems
with its implementation. Bruce Clark, vice president of Apotex's regulatory and
medical affairs, said that the law is 'laborious and convoluted' and that it is 'almost
a waste for us to go through the process."88 If developed countries are really
committed to the goal of universal access to AIDS drugs, then less laborious
mechanisms should be put in place. It is imperative that G8 countries embark
on practical means to achieve what they committed to in the World Summit -
the 2010 Global Target on Universal Access for HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention,
care and support.'89 This was also reiterated in the recent XVII International AIDS
Conference in Mexico. 90
185 Love, supra note 161.
186 K. E. Maskus and J. H. Reichman, 'The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and
the Privatisation of Global Public Goods', 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004):
279-320.
187 Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report 'Complexity of Canadian Law Hindering Shipments of Generic
Antiretrovirals to Developing Countries, Company Says' (24 September 2008), available at
http://www.kaisemetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=1&DRID=54620.
188 Ibid.
189 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US pledged to ensure universal
access to antiretroviral treatment worldwide by 2010. See details in Outcome Document from
the 2005 World Summit, 15 September.
190 The XVII International AIDS Conference was held in Mexico from 3 to 8 August 2008.
